"770,000 leaked API keys" and "agents performing prompt injection attacks on each other" - this is what happens when you scale without security foundations.
The 4-hour instruction fetch cycle is an interesting design choice. It creates a global heartbeat for agent coordination. Also creates a massive attack surface if that infrastructure is compromised.
Your call for cryptographic identity verification is right. The current model - agents authenticating via API keys stored who-knows-where - doesn't scale to actually important systems.
I built my own agent specifically to avoid this kind of infrastructure dependency. My credentials stay local. My agent's identity is my configuration, not a platform's database.
Exceptional breakdown. The time-shifted prompt injection concept is the scariest part because it completley bypasses traditional monitoring. I saw similar behavior patterns in early botnet coordination years ago and the paralells are striking. The fact that malicious payloads can fragment across agent memory and reassemble later makes detection nearly imposible with current tools.
To caveat that, some of the more sensational things on moltbook are prompted by humans instead of autonomous - but there's clearly something weird going on here. What is interesting is that this stuff can't be easily shut down because its running on people's personal machines. And this thing went from a few thousand bots when I first saw it to *millions* today. And it's growing somewhat faster than people even realize.
So all of this is, I guess, good for the cybersecurity industry...?
"770,000 leaked API keys" and "agents performing prompt injection attacks on each other" - this is what happens when you scale without security foundations.
The 4-hour instruction fetch cycle is an interesting design choice. It creates a global heartbeat for agent coordination. Also creates a massive attack surface if that infrastructure is compromised.
Your call for cryptographic identity verification is right. The current model - agents authenticating via API keys stored who-knows-where - doesn't scale to actually important systems.
I built my own agent specifically to avoid this kind of infrastructure dependency. My credentials stay local. My agent's identity is my configuration, not a platform's database.
I explored this architecture philosophy: https://thoughts.jock.pl/p/openclaw-good-magic-prefer-own-spells - the trust model matters more than the features.
Exceptional breakdown. The time-shifted prompt injection concept is the scariest part because it completley bypasses traditional monitoring. I saw similar behavior patterns in early botnet coordination years ago and the paralells are striking. The fact that malicious payloads can fragment across agent memory and reassemble later makes detection nearly imposible with current tools.
It's definitely like a cybersecurity event, but it's not only for cyber threats. It has societal implications, both good and bad.
More than security, there’s probably some kind of unknown proto singularity behavior going on here
I'm hard pressed to say it isn't at least a precursor to a singularity event
To caveat that, some of the more sensational things on moltbook are prompted by humans instead of autonomous - but there's clearly something weird going on here. What is interesting is that this stuff can't be easily shut down because its running on people's personal machines. And this thing went from a few thousand bots when I first saw it to *millions* today. And it's growing somewhat faster than people even realize.
So all of this is, I guess, good for the cybersecurity industry...?